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LECTURE ONE: THE USES OF EMPIRICISM AND THE
USES OF FANATICISM
I would like to begin by thanking Dean Holland and the lawschool for inviting me to visit this lovely part of America to de-
liver the Inaugural Development Fund Lectures. Over the next two
nights, I will be talking about the relationship between the liberal
theory of constitutional law and ways of reasoning about moral and
empirical propositions. In tonight's lecture, which I call The Uses
of Empiricism and the Uses of Fanaticism, I will discuss the fre-
quent preference of judges in constitutional cases to deal with em-
pirical questions rather than moral ones and, when possible, to turn
• Professor of Law, Yale University. This Article is a revised version of the Inaugu-
ral Development Fund Lecture, delivered at the University of Oregon School of Law on
February 8 & 9, 1990. An earlier version was presented to the Legal Theory Workshop
at New York Law School. In addition to comments made on both of those occasions, I
have had the special benefit of extended conversations and critiques from Bruce Acker-
man, Enola Aird, Robert Blecker, Michael Perry, and Ruti Teitel. Suchma Soni pro-
vided very fine research assistance.
[471]
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the latter into the former. Tomorrow evening I will analyze the
particular difficulties that are posed when a constitutional law built
on a preference for empirical questions confronts the very different
epistemology that often flows from religious devotion.
My subject matter, I think, is especially appropriate for a lecture
here in Oregon, because one of the cases that I plan to assess in
tomorrow night's lecture originated in this state. I have in mind
Employment Division v. Smith,l a case no doubt familiar to many of
you. In Smith, two former employees of the State of Oregon insist
that the first amendment's free exercise clause protects their right to
use peyote, a controlled substance, as part of a religious ritual. The
issues raised by the Smith case are fascinating and intricate,2 but
they are, as I say, for tomorrow's lecture.
Tonight's lecture is on a somewhat different point, and by way of
introducing the evening's subject matter, I would like to take you
on a small journey in space and time, ending up about two thousand
miles to the east and just about a century into the past. No doubt
most of you have heard a tale of some legislature somewhere in the
country that once tried to set the value of the ratio of the circumfer-
ence of a circle to its diameter, the irrational number known as pi,
to 3. Whether that ever happened, I do not know, but according to
Petr Beckmann, author of a wonderful little book entitled A History
ofPi, something similar did occur in Indiana in 1897.3 I cannot tell
the story with Beckmann's flair, and for those interested in the de-
tails of the tale, I recommend the book itself. But let me try to
summanze.
Evidently, an Indiana physician, one Edwin J. Goodwin, had de-
veloped (or thought he had developed) a formula for computing cir-
cular area through a method known as squaring the circle. The
multiplier used in Goodwin's formula was nowhere near an accu-
rate approximation for the value of pi-it was too large by about a
factor of three4-but he was apparently able to convince the legisla-
1 Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990).
2 After these lectures were delivered, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled
against the employee's free exercise claims. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990).
3 See P. BECKMANN, A HISTORY OF PI 174 (1970). I should mention explicitly my
debt to Beckman's remarkable book for first stimulating me to think about many of the
issues discussed in this paper.
4 [d. Goodwin apparently intended a value of approximately 16 divided by the square
root of three, see id., which yields a number beginning 9.2376. The correct value of pi
calculated to the seventh decimal place is 3.1415926.
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ture that he had found the answer. He offered this answer to the
state without charge, if the legislature would adopt his fonnula as
law.s Thus in January of 1897, a member of the Indiana House of
Representatives introduced what was styled "A bill introducing a
new Mathematical truth,"6 and provided in part:
It has been found that a circular area is to the square on a line
equal to the quadrant of the circumference, as the area of an
equilateral rectangle is to the square on one side. The diameter
employed as the linear unit according to the present rule in com-
puting the circle's area is entirely wrong ....7
As pointed out by Petr Beckmann, "rectangle" is almost certainly a
misprint for "triangle,"S but details of that sort are irrelevant to the
present purpose. Suffice it to say that from that awkward begin-
ning, the bill grew progressively more complex and as its complex-
ity increased, it made less and less sense.9 The bill concluded with
the observation that the inventor had solved "noted problems . . .
long since given up by scientific bodies as unsolvable mysteries and
above man's abilities to comprehend."10
Arrant nonsense the bill might have been, but it nevertheless
emerged from the Education Committee (to which it had been re-
ferred by the Committee on Swamp Lands), and subsequently
passed the Indiana House by a vote of 67-0. II In the Senate, says
Beckmann, the bill was sent to the Committee on Temperance (I
don't know why; neither does Beckmann). That committee re-
ported the bill favorably, and it might have passed the Senate, too,
making Goodwin's fonnula the law of the state, but for the fortui-
tous intervention of a professor of mathematics from Purdue, who
happened to be visiting the state legislature on unrelated business
while the Senate was debating the bill. Warned by the professor,
the legislature returned the bill to committee, where it died I2-evi-
dence, one might suppose, that Someone is Watching, a piece of
SId. at 174. "[O]thers would evidently have to pay royalties." Id. If this purported
escape from a responsibility to pay royalties for using Goodwin's formula played a part
in the legislature's decision to consider the bill, then the action was doubly irrational:
mathematical formulas are not patentable subject matter. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).




10 Id. at 177.
IIId.
12Id.
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good fortune with which legislatures are rarely favored, and, when
so favored, to which they all too often fail to attend.
Well, all right. Let me summarize the story from the viewpoint of
what we might call a liberal materialist; that is, a devotee of both
liberal political theory and natural science. I3 The Indiana statute
defining the circular area was plainly a bad law-bad in the sense
that it reflected a misunderstanding of mathematics. The inventor,
Dr. Goodwin, was a crackpot who nearly hoodwinked the Indiana
legislature into doing something foolish because of a general igno-
rance about science. Only through the intervention of a mathemat-
ics professor as deus ex machina, was the state saved from its own
folly. In liberal terms, then, the story's ending is a happy one.
Had there been no intervention, would the statute (which, for
convenience, we might call the Circular Area Act) have been un-
constitutional? One might suppose that if the Supreme Court's
minimum rationality test has any bite, this might be the rare in-
stance of a wholly irrational statute that should be struck down.
Still, if one accepts Ronald Dworkin's gentle correction, for which
there is much to be said, that what lawyers call the rationality re-
quirement really only asks that the state offer a plausible argument
in support of the challenged policy,I4 the state's claim that the legis-
lators really believed in the correctness of Dr. Goodwin's formula
might be sufficient. After all, the argument against the statute is
simply that the legislature erred, and a mistake in analysis is not the
same as a constitutional violation.
Or is it?
My claim in tonight's lecture is that the matter is not so clear. In
cases involving subjects as diverse as prison conditions, reproduc-
tive freedom, and school desegregation, our constitutional courts
have shown what might be called a preference for counting rather
than reasoning. With troubling but increasing frequency, the courts
have framed constitutional questions in ways that permit them to
point out the legislature's errors in analysis rather than condemn
the legislature's moral vision.
A good example of what I have in mind is Rhodes v. Chapman, 15
13 Some readers have objected to my linking of "liberal" and "materialist" in this
fashion. By way of clarification, I shall explain that I am being descriptive, not pejora-
tive. My reference is to the liberal who is guided in empirical evaluations by natural
science.
14 R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 382 (1986); cf United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
15 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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decided by the Supreme Court of the United States about nine years
ago. In Rhodes, the Justices ruled that the State of Ohio did not
violate the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment when it housed two or more inmates in cells built for one. But
the principal dispute between the majority and the dissent was over
the interpretation and significance of the findings of social science
and medical researchers on the effect of prison crowding. The
members of the Court, then, were not arguing over constitutional
text, structure, or history. They were not even arguing over moral-
ity. They were arguing over the empirical evidence. They were
counting, not reasoning.
This preference for talking about things that are measurable
mimics a more general difficulty with liberalism as a moral theory.
Ever since the Enlightenment dethroned God-or at least, the con-
cept of God-as the ultimate source of knowledge, liberal theory
has faced the authority problem. The idea of the Enlightenment
was to make human reason supreme; but somewhere along the way,
reason proved to be a bit too shabby, too indeterminate, too unpre-
dictable. At the same time, one of the proudest products of human
reason-natural science-seemed to offer the authoritative basis for
knowledge that liberalism needs if it is to preserve the crucial dis-
tinction between facts and values.
The trouble was that whereas God had provided authority for
both knowledge about the physical world and knowledge about mo-
rality (and indeed, in some theological visions, there is no distinc-
tion between the two), natural science could provide a level of
certainty only about knowledge of the physical world. What then
to do about moral knowledge?
One plausible answer is to avoid moral debate, and to muddle
instead. American society has been in a moral muddle for a long
time, however, and the result has not always been moral goodness.
At the metaethicallevel, unfortunately, any effort to do more seems
to end up with people talking past each other. Arthur Leff may
have been right-napalming babies is bad-but he was surely right
as well to note that somebody, somewhere, will answer Sez who? 16
The possibility of moral dissent does not by itself eliminate the pos-
sibility of moral truth, any more than the possibility of scientific
dissent eliminates the possibility of scientific truth. But our nation's
pluralistic, sometimes relativistic, approach to moral questions does
16 Left', Unspeakable Ethics. Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230.
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make government action based on moral consensus difficult, and
sometimes impossible.
The natural science model, however, offers a potential solution to
the problem of moral authority. That answer is scientism. If moral
questions can be made to look like scientific questions, then the au-
thority problem is seemingly solved. If our moral or legal dialogue
can be made to look like scientific dialogue, then we are not illegiti-
mately imposing our moral beliefs. Weare not even discussing
them; we are simply doing what the facts require of us. So domi-
nant has the scientistic model of reasoning become that people who
work out moral conclusions in other ways are treated as though
they ought to be embarassed by their lack of eruditionY Remem-
ber Spiro Agnew's famous line? (Remember Spiro Agnew?) He
said, "You don't learn about poverty from people who are poor, but
from experts who have studied the problem." Agnew was ridiculed,
but in that one sentence he captured the essence of the scientistic
way of thinking. If you want to make a public policy proposal, it's a
good idea to have something empirical on which to rest it.
Take as an example the matter of whether drivers should be re-
quired to wear safety belts, and the implications for tort law when
they do not-a point on which the Oregon Supreme Court not long
ago decided two important cases, Dahl v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke (BMW) 18 and Morast v. James. 19 Advocates of mandatory
seatbelt requirements stress the potential savings, in lives and
money, using these measurable, materialistic effects to sidestep,
rather than refute, the libertarian moral arguments of their
opponents.
The scientistic solution matters not only for moral dialogue but
for constitutional dialogue as well, because in the United States, for
good or for ill, constitutional adjudication represents perhaps our
most important forum for broad-based, public moral debate. But in
an unfortunate reflection of developments in liberal theory, scien-
tism is slowly conquering our constitutional dialogue, which means,
of course, that it is infecting our moral dialogue as well. In to-
night's lecture, I shall not attempt a detailed analysis but rather will
17 Something similar has happened in legal scholarship, with the unsettling move
from an emphasis on the reasoning of the text to an emphasis on the erudition of the
footnotes. Cf Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. V.L. REV. 275 (1988) (a sometimes whim-
sical critique of footnoting).
18 304 Or. 558, 748 P.2d 77 (1987).
19 304 Or. 571, 748 P.2d 84 (1987). Dahl and Morast have subsequently been over-
ruled by statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 18.580 (1989).
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try to give examples of the infection itself, and, in so doing, to illu-
minate some of the ways in which the virus of scientism weakens
the moral claims of liberal theory and the claims to legitimacy of
liberal law.
A. Fanatical Morality
I want to return to Indiana and the Circular Area Bill, but I want
to view it through the glass of a more recent controversy that bears
some similarities. So let us leave the nineteenth century, move for-
ward in time some eighty years, and take what is surely a familiar
case. Just about a decade ago, a young lawyer named Stephen
Galebach published an article in the Human Life Review explaining
how, in his view, Congress could overturn Roe v. Wade 20 through
the simple expedient of enacting a statute that would define human
life as beginning at conception.21 This, he said, was an invitation
left open by the Supreme Court's frank confession in Roe that the
Justices were unable to find any societal consensus on the beginning
of life. According to Galebach, this confession provided important
support for the majority's conclusion. Using its authority under
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, said Galebach, the same
authority that had supported, for example, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, Congress could fill in the holes, granting rights where the
Court had discovered none. 22
In 1981, a Human Life Bill was introduced in the Senate, and
hearings were held before the Subcommittee on Separation of Pow-
ers of the Committee on the Judiciary. (Whatever your views on
the bill, I think you will agree that the name of the committee that
considered it is at least an improvement.) The subcommittee set
itself the task of learning whether, as a matter of scientific defini-
tion, human life could be said to begin at conception.
Both sides-by which I mean pro-life and pro-choice forces-
called witnesses from among scientific researchers, and other wit-
nesses as well. The supporters of the Human Life Bill introduced
evidence that, in their view, tended to show that as a matter of
shared scientific understanding, human life begins at or close to
conception. The bill's opponents argued that the start of human life
20 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21 Galebach, A Human Life Statute, 7 THE HUMAN LIFE REV. 3 (1981).
22 I analyze Galebach's constitutional argument, as well as the arguments of his crit-
ics, in Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional
Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986).
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is not a scientific question at all; or, failing that, that the scientific
evidence relied on by the bill's supporters was bad science. The
subcommittee, by a 3-2 vote, reported favorably on the bill. But,
perhaps unsurprisingly, it died in the larger Judiciary Committee,
which never formally took it up.
I would suggest to you that the liberal materialist summary of the
effort to create a statutory definition of when human life begins
would be identical to the liberal materialist summary of the effort to
create a statutory definition of pi-a scientifically ignorant legisla-
ture, etc., etc.-with the important distinction that in the case of the
Human Life Bill, the liberal critic might add the observation that
the proponents were fanatics, trying to impose their narrow moral
vision on others. In the world of contemporary political conversa-
tion, imposing one's moral vision on another is of course a consider-
able offense, about as bad as the offense, in the world of liberal
theory, of imposing on another one's vision of a life well lived.
What I want to focus on, however, is the reason that the propo-
nents of the Human Life Bill are considered fanatics, whereas the
proponents of what I have called the Circular Area Bill are merely
misguided. After all, one could readily generalize the two cases as
involving legislative enactments based on particular factual assump-
tions. The Indiana legislature might really have believed the new
means for calculating the circular area to be more accurate than the
old. The Senate subcommittee that reported the Human Life Bill
might really have believed that human life begins at conception.
So, what are the distinctions? Well, in the first place, the Human
Life Bill, because it impinges on a fundamental right, is far more
likely than the Circular Area Bill to be found unconstitutional. But
of course it is possible to write the Circular Area Bill, too, in a way
that impinges on rights; for example, by making it a crime to teach
any other formula for computing circular area.23 Besides, mere un-
constitutionality is a positivist claim and seems unlikely to ade-
quately explain the reason that the Circular Area Bill generates
amusement, whereas the Human Life Bill generates outrage.
A second distinction has to do with the politics of the two pieces
of legislation. No one who hears the story of the Circular Area Bill
believes that the Indiana legislature was actually up to any moral
mischief-the legislators are presumed to have been sincere-so ig-
norance and confusion are adequate explanations for what hap-
23 Cf Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (establishment clause grounds);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (privacy grounds).
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pened, and the intervention by a professional mathematician ended
the matter.
The Human Life Bill, on the other hand, is seen as a smoke-
screen, morality masquerading as science. According to the liberal
critique of the Human Life Bill, the supporters did not really care
what answer science might offer to the question of when human life
begins or, indeed, whether science even has an answer. The sup-
porters of the Human Life Bill, then, are seen in the liberal critique
as moral fanatics who are unable to obtain enforcement of their
moral views in the liberal state. Therefore, they style their morality
as science in the hope of making their views palatable.
Let me return once more to the Indiana legislature and the Circu-
lar Area Bill. No fanaticism here, not at least on the record as it
appears; just a mistaken understanding of mathematics. But sup-
pose now that we have an additional bit of information. What we
now learn is that the Indiana legislature is controlled by adherents
of a religion-let us call it Faith A-that follows a sacred text that
includes an ancient description of the computation of circular area;
a description, as it happens, identical to the one upon which Dr.
Goodwin happened. If we further learn that Faith A requires its
adherents to live their lives in accordance with all parts of the sa-
cred text, including the formula, the case of the Circular Area Bill
suddenly becomes quite different, and quite similar.
In terms of the bill's actual effect, nothing whatsoever has
changed merely because we now believe that a religious motivation
was lurking behind it. But in liberal constitutional analysis and the
contemporary version of liberal moral analysis, that religious moti-
vation makes all the difference. Now, suddenly, the legislators (and
for all we know, Dr. Goodwin as well) are not merely ignorant-
they are superstitious! More to the point, they are fanatical: they
are using the guise of mathematics to write into law a tenet of their
religion.
Both examples involve efforts to transform moral views from an
unacceptable to an acceptable form without altering their essence,
an effort I shall refer to as the move fromJanatical morality to em-
pirical morality. The pro-life movement is the modern model of fa-
naticism in the liberal sense. A fanatic is someone who is difficult or
impossible to convert to another moral position through a process
of dialogue-in particular, dialogue about natural science, a point
to which I will return. Naturally, this definition includes people
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whose morality is based on religious beliefs, but it includes many
other people too.
The liberal state favors empirical morality, which is my term for
modem law's homage to the Enlightenment. The epistemological
point of the Enlightenment was to alter the nature of authority, to
replace God alone with human reason. Liberal psychology since
Kant requires a division between facts and values: facts are observa-
tions about the world, values are moral propositions that we apply
to those facts. Everyone who is not a fanatic, of course, agrees on
what the facts are, or (perhaps more importantly) on how facts are
to be found. The empirical moralist is willing to be persuaded, in
light of these agreed and obvious facts, to change her mind. Conse-
quently, another way of stating the devotion to empirical morality is
this: it represents a preference for moral propositions that are
stated in ways that lead to testable factual propositions.
This suggests a third distinction between the Human Life Bill and
the Circular Area Bill: epistemology. The Indiana legislature, as I
have said, simply made a mistake. But the supporters of the
Human Life Bill were using scientistic language to bolster a conclu-
sion reached on other grounds. Even before undertaking any legis-
lative drafting or any scientific investigation or any hearings, they
already knew when human life begins. The source of their knowl-
edge is not important now, although I will come to that. What does
matter is that the source was not materialist science.
It might be useful in this connection to quote the question raised
by Jeffrey Stout in the introduction to his very fine book on justifica-
tion after the Enlightenment, The Flight from Authority. "Do we,
then, have any knowledge?" he asks. 24 His concern is whether, in a
post-Enlightenment world in which the authority of God is no
longer available as a justification, we can be sufficiently sure of any-
thing to the extent that we can say we know it. He is worried about
the possibility of an infinite regress of justifications needing justifica-
tion, an epistemology that finally swallows itself.
I would not of course contend that liberalism has reached that
point, but it is certainly true-I think I am correct that no major
liberal theorist dissents-that none of the fundamental principles of
liberal reasoning can be justified without looking outside the princi-
ple itself. So, for example, Rawls' original position needs a justifica-
tion apart from one flowing from the original position, Ackerman's
24 J. STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 8 (1981).
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neutral dialogue needs a justification outside of neutral dialogue,
and so forth. Although I will have nothing further to say about
justification just now, I ask the listener to keep the question in
mind, because I plan to return to it at the conclusion of tomorrow
night's lecture. For the rest of this evening, however, I would like
to talk about empirical morality.
B. Empirical Morality
It is empirical morality, then, that has come to dominate liberal
dialogue and, by extension, liberal law. Empirical morality is
couched in terms of appeal to values so over-arching that no one
would dispute them. The battle, then, becomes one over facts.
Public moral debate is extraordinarily difficult in the United States.
People react with horror to any suggestion that morality is about to
be imposed by one individual or group on another. (Never mind
that we impose morality all the time; I am thinking here of practical
politics.)
In constitutional law, which is the place where our moral battles
tend to be fought, matters are in some ways better but in some ways
far worse. Part of this is the Supreme Court's fault. Over the past
few decades, through sweeping judgments that render one side of
the moral argument out of bounds because unconstitutional, the
court has preempted discussion on a series of moral questions. It's
much easier to avoid moral argument when you have the Constitu-
tion on your side, and much easier as well to dismiss your morally
minded opponent with a casual, "Oh, come on, that's unconstitu-
tional"-appealing, you see, to one of our transcendent moral
norms, the respect for law, and placing the opponent who insists on
continuing the argument in the position of advocating disrespect for
law, and therefore playing the role of the fanatic.
Remember the old lawyer's joke? If you don't have the law on
your side, argue the facts; if you don't have the facts on your side,
argue justice? Well, the scientistic approach to moral argument,
and, by extension, to constitutional argument, is like that, too. Jus-
tice-the end-product, if you will, of liberal theory-is treated as a
second-best (or perhaps third-best) subject of argument. Only
fanatics make a lot of noise about morality; the smart, reflective
liberal, however, makes an empirical case.
Moral and constitutional dialogue of this sort seems easier for
liberal courts to stomach. The liberal judge is not supposed to im-
pose her own moral judgments (or, for that matter, the moral judg-
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ments of the litigants), but she can certainly sort out the facts. Even
though many open-ended constitutional provisions appear designed
to invite a degree of moral reasoning, the mediating force of scien-
tistic liberalism insists that the appeal to morality be resisted, and
that the litigants instead find ways to transform the
moral/constitutional dispute into an argument over the facts..
Does this seem a little strong? I hope not, because I think the
problem is an important one. Consider, for example, the natural
extension of the Circular Area Bill: the scientific creationism legis-
lation that keeps cropping up in various comers of the Bible Belt.
The most fascinating aspect of the litigation over creationism, and
of the public argument as well, is that while liberal critics try and
often succeed to paint the creationists as fanatics-people who
don't care about the facts-the creationist effort at scientism has
had a very important success. When the cases are litigated, the op-
ponents of the legislation always produce evidence that the crea-
tionist theory is false.
Why is this a victory for creationists? Because on the model that
I have mentioned, one need not debate with the fanatic in empirical
terms. Rather, one dismisses the fanatic on grounds of an imposi-
tion of morality. So, one might think that in the case of teaching
creationism in the public schools alongside evolution-the "equal
time" requirement that is the centerpiece of the creationist legisla-
tive strategy-the reviewing court would find a religious motivation
and say, "End of case."
That is not, however, what the courts do. Instead, they spend
considerable time analyzing the evidence that creationism is bad sci-
ence.25 And bad science it may be, at least by the standards of ma-
terialist science, which requires theories that are testable and,
ultimately, provable in the natural world. 26 But by treating the
cases in this fashion, the judges set up a fascinating paradox. Sup-
pose that what the putative fanatics wanted to teach turned out to
be good science? Would the courts permit it to be taught? If the
answer is no, then the effort to refute creationism by denying its
factual base is a huge waste of judicial resources. We must there-
fore assume that the answer is yes. Yes, the courts would permit a
religiously motivated legislature to teach creationism were creation-
25 The most painstaking effort occurred in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
26See, e.g., GOULD, HEN'S TEETH AND HORSE'S TOES 254-62 (1983) (discussing
how creationism fails this test).
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ism better science than it is-a proposition that would imply that
the only thing that the adherents of Faith A did wrong in the Circu-
lar Area Bill was compute the value of pi badly.
Nevertheless, consider the consequences if the problem with crea-
tionism is that it is both religiously motivated and wrong, rather
than one or the other. If both are required before creationism can
be struck down, then the court is in the business not of exercising its
comparative advantage in deciding on the law, but rather of making
a potentially difficult decision about scientific fact. So although the
opponents of creationism win battle after battle, the creationists
may be winning the war, because the courts are treating the cases as
though what matters is the empirical basis for the claims that crea-
tionists make. Although the creationists have so far lost the cases,
they have succeeded in transforming an argument over imposition
of religious belief into an argument over the facts; that is, they have
transformed fanatical morality into empirical morality. That suc-
cess hints at the advantage of empirical morality: unless the judges
are lying, if the facts should turn out to be different than previously
thought, your side might later win.
Similarly, the effort by the gay rights movement to portray homo-
sexuality as innate rather than chosen can be viewed as a response
to the pressure of empirical morality. The innateness claim has the
advantage of inviting equal protection scrutiny of restrictions on
conduct that can be seen as disadvantaging a particular sexual pref-
erence. However, as a constitutional, or for that matter a moral
issue, it is difficult to see why it ought to matter whether sexual
preference is, as the name implies, a choice or whether it is some-
thing innate. Surely the privacy argument in support of free sexual
relations between consenting adults is straightforward, both as a
moral matter and as a constitutional one.
I realize that the Supreme Court has already rejected that argu-
ment in Bowers v. Hardwick. 27 But Bowers is a difficult decision to
defend on doctrinal grounds, at least if one takes Griswold v. Con-
necticut 28 to mean what it says. In Griswold, remember, the Court
overturned Connecticut's anti-contraception law in large measure
because (in the Court's view) its enforcement required gross viola-
tions of marital privacy. The Justices seemed to envision a sort of
sexual legitimacy police force breaking into "the sacred precincts of
27 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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marital bedrooms."29 That, the majority argued, the Constitution
had to forbid.
Well, Bowers isn't much different, is it? Again, the sexuallegiti-
macy police would have to be unleashed to enforce Georgia's anti-
sodomy statute. Obviously, the precincts wouldn't be marital, but
the police might not know that until they arrived and undertook the
search. Besides, even if the jump from marital precincts to those
housing unmarried significant others seems a bit far, surely it is not
as far as the jump from the privacy of consenting adults in the mari-
tal bedroom to the privacy of doctor and patient in the obstetri-
cian's office-the jump that the Court endorsed in Roe v. Wade. 30
In other words, if Roe follows from Griswold, then, it seems to me, a
fortiori, Bowers is wrongly decided.
Now of course, one may respond that Roe is wrong. It is cer-
tainly true that the jump from Griswold to Roe is difficult to defend
on doctrinal grounds, a point admitted even by some of its
staunchest defenders. And lately the Justices have shown every
sign of backing away from the rule of Roe.31 But even if Roe were
overturned, it would still strike me as true that the jump from Gris-
wold to the opposite result in Bowers is a very small one. To be
sure, one might argue in response that Griswold itself is doctrinally
unjustified, and, indeed, it is not as easy as some of Griswold's de-
fenders suppose to point to its constitutional moorings.32 But as
long as Griswold is the law of the land, surely an anti-sodomy stat-
ute must stand on weaker footing than an anti-abortion statute.
As I said, however, the Supreme Court has already rejected all of
this. The constitutional right to privacy does not extend to all sex-
ual acts between consenting adults and, in particular, does not ex-
tend to acts constituting sodomy between adults of the same sex.
That is unhappy law, but that is what the law is. So I suppose that
the move toward an equal protection argument is unsurprising.
Still, the possibility of an equal protection strategy brings me back
to my point about the pressures of empirical morality. In order to
bring the sexual acts of adults of the same sex within the ambit of
the equal protection clause, it is necessary to envision the law as a
29Id. at 485.
30410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
32 Making this argument is, however, a political risk, as Judge Bork discovered. See
REPORT OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, ON THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT
H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 30-
36 (1987).
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discrimination against individuals for their innate characteristics
rather than for their actions. Thus, the scientistic claim is made
that a homosexual or heterosexual preference is inborn, or at least
that a predisposition is inborn. If the claim is correct, then to dis-
criminate on the basis of homosexual acts is the same as discrimi-
nating on the basis of the inborn predisposition.
Not a bad theory, once one accepts the premise. (Of course, one
must also accept that the predisposition is not only inborn but nor-
mal, i.e., not psychologically deviant, but one who accepts the
premise should have no difficulty with this corollary.) The trouble
is that the premise is an empirical one. One may perfectly well as-
sert that the predisposition to homosexuality is inborn, but once it is
asserted, it is a proposition about the world, and may be either true
or false.
If the constitutional case rests on a proposition that is either true
or false, then the case is refuted if one refutes the proposition. If the
moral case rests on the same proposition, then anyone unconvinced
of the proposition will be unconvinced by the moral case. Or, to put
the matter the other way, when a claim of right rests on a claim that
is empirically falsifiable, then the right necessarily vanishes if the
empirical claim is falsified.
This, you will recall, is the criticism that has always been leveled
against the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. 33 At the time that Brown was decided, the "equal but sepa-
rate" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson 34 was the accepted formulation for
deciding the constitutionality of particular instances of segregation.
The entire litigation strategy leading to Brown involved a series of
cases in which anti-segregation lawyers would argue not that Plessy
was wrong, but that in the case before the Court, the separate facili-
ties maintained for black and white were not actually equal.3S
In Brown, the Justices faced the dilemma of making their opinion
palatable to a nation not yet convinced that segregation was an evil.
Thus, as its basis for the conclusion that Plessy misconceived equal
protection, the Brown Court drew a prior conclusion that Plessy
misconceived the harm caused to victims of segregation. How did
the Brown Court know that Plessy got the matter wrong? Because
"[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge"
at the time that Plessy was decided, the Court's view of the psychol-
33347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35 See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975).
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ogy of segregation was "amply supported by modem authority."36
As proof the Justices appended the famous footnote 11, which
listed a series of social science studies bolstering the Court's psycho-
logical understanding.37 The opinion was immediately attacked by
critics who claimed the studies were wrong, and no wonder; the
Court was practically inviting such a critique. For the implication
of footnote 11, if one takes the opinion seriously, is that if better
studies came along suggesting that segregated black children devel-
oped and adjusted as well as or better than integrated ones, Brown
ought to be reversed. And if after that, new studies pointed back
toward footnote 11 's original conclusion, then the original rule
ought to be reinstated. And so on and so on, with everything turn-
ing on the current state of psychological understanding. In this
way, at least as a constitutional matter, the Justices managed to
transform racial segregation from an oppressive horror into an error
in analysis.
That point, of course, is one that legions of critics have already
made. What the critics have missed, however, is that the Justices
were hardly alone in preferring to argue over the facts rather than
argue over values. Indeed, the field of race relations provides an-
other unsettling example. Consider the common understanding of
racial stereotyping. Stereotyping, we are told time and again, is irra-
tional. It is the irrational attribution of characteristics to particular
individuals based on generalizations about the groups to which they
belong. Or, as Gordon Allport put it in The Nature of Prejudice,
racial prejudice is "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible
generalization."38
But (as I have argued elsewhere), if the problem with racial ste-
reotypes is overinclusivity, then the condemnation of thinking in
stereotypical terms carries little normative content,39 It is, rather, a
condemnation of sloppy thinking. The message of the dismissal of
stereotypes as irrational is "Don't use them because they don't
work"-an essentially empirical critique. The trouble is that the
stereotyper might conclude, on the contrary, that racial stereotypes
do work, or at least that they work as well as other generalizations
one makes to simplify life. Or, to put the matter more formally, a
particular individual might conclude that the benefits of stereotyp-
36 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
37 [d. at 494 n.11.
38 G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE Of PREJUDICE 9 (1954).
39 See Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 429-39 (1988).
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ing (principally lower search costs) outweigh the costs (the potential
loss of value, discounted by the likelihood that the value will in fact
be present).
This might seem an odd way to think about racial stereotyping,
but the condemnation of stereotyping on the ground that it is irra-
tional really does invite a listener to respond, "Well, it works for
me!" And unless an empirical refutation is available, the critique of
stereotyping fails. So it turns out that the Brown Court was simply
thinking the same way that many people think about racial matters:
empirical evidence is the key to deciding whether particular in-
stances of what others might consider racism are actually right or
wrong. There is, then, no value choice, in Brown or in the condem-
nation of racial stereotyping, except for the value holding that
sloppy analysis is bad. And that is what I mean by empirical
morality.
Again, think back on Roe v. Wade and the question of when
human life begins. Remember what the majority said about the
claim that the fetus was a person within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment? The Court wrote: "If this suggestion of per-
sonhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for
the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment."40 Now, quite apart from the fact that the conclusion
of the sentence hardly follows from the premise-a point argued
convincingly by Robert Bork41-100k at what the Court has done.
It turns out that the moral question is subsequent to a prior empiri-
cal question: is the fetus human? If it is, then there is no right to an
abortion. No wonder there was an effort to pass a Human Life Bill!
For, the suggestion of this sentence is that Roe v. Wade was not,
after all, about the right to end a pregnancy; it was about whether
the fetus is human.
Of course, one may object that the question of when human life
begins is not an empirical one. But that is a non sequitur. For as
Daniel Callahan has pointed out, no matter what definition of
human life one offers, the definition will require some empirical in-
put-and at that point, the question becomes an empirical one.42
40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
41 The Human Life Bill: Hearings on 5.158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 308-16 (1982) (Iesti-
mony and prepared statement of Robert Bork).
42 Callahan, The Role ofScience in Moral and Societal Decision Making: The Human
Life Bill as a Case Study, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
IMPLICATIONS 314,316 (M. Shaw and A. Dondera eds. 1983).
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This point, I think, was missed by those who criticized the Human
Life Bill for trying to be scientistic about something that is not sci-
entific. Of course there is no scientific answer to the question
"When does human life begin?" But once a definition is proffered-
a human being is a fetus that is viable, or a human being is a fetus
that can react to pain stimuli, or a human being is a fetus after
birth--choose whatever you like-scientific researchers can clearly
provide information that will help give an answer.
This is how the theory of Brown is linked to the effort to overturn
Roe on the ground of fetal humanity. Both tum out to rest on em-
pirical moral visions. For the argument that abortion is wrong be-
cause the fetus is human, like the argument that segregation is
wrong because it is harmful, collapses if the empirical premise turns
out to be false.
Still, it is important not to overlook in all of this the fact that the
weakness of empirical morality sweeps both ways. Consider that
most of the pro-choice movement would reply to the fetal humanity
argument with "But the fetus isn't human!" That answer, of
course, is subject to the same constraints as the pro-life answer that
I have been discussing. It turns a legal or moral argument into
what is effectively an empirical one. For once the pro-choicer de-
fines human life, there is the risk of new scientific evidence that the
fetus fits the definition-or perhaps that many newborn children do
not. Naturally, it is possible to change the definition once new evi-
dence shows that the old one does not support the claim, and in the
abortion area this seems to be a regular habit of both sides.
But if the decision about what facts matter changes as new facts
cast doubt on the prior moral conclusion, it is easy to see that the
empirical claim is not driving the moral judgment. Rather, the
moral judgment is driving the empirical claim. What I mean is that
very often the factual propositions are disguises for the real debate.
Oddly reluctant to join issue on the basic moral questions, the advo-
cates argue about the facts instead.
Consider, for example, the recent study from Baltimore purport-
ing to show that among inner-city teenagers who are sexually ac-
tive, those who have been pregnant and had abortions tended to do
better in school and in various other social measures, including self-
esteem, than those who carried pregnancies to term or, for that mat-
ter, than those who have never been pregnant at all.43 Pro-life
43 See A Study o/Teenagers Hints Gain/or Those Having Abortions, N.Y. Times, Jan.
25, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
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groups immediately attacked the study as biased and shoddy, just as
pro-choice groups have long attacked studies purporting to show
that abortion is more psychologically harmful than childbirth. Few
in the debate seem to care very much what the best scientific answer
is. Most participants, I suspect, make up their minds about which
studies to trust without even glancing at them, in keeping with the
old adage that the work that is least biased and most careful is the
work that supports the observer's side.
Why do people carry on this way? Have they learned nothing
from the argument over footnote 11 ofBrown? Why can't pro-lifers
be satisfied with saying, "Abortion is wrong even if the fetus is not
human and even if the pregnant woman is better off aborting"?
Why can't pro-choicers say, "No woman should be forced to carry
an unwanted fetus even if the fetus is human and even if the woman
would be harmed more by the abortion than by carrying the preg-
nancy to term"?
There are, I would suggest, two reasons. Each of them is related
to the way that we frame moral questions in our post-Enlighten-
ment confusion and, by extension, the way that we frame legal ones.
The first reason, and the more attractive, is that both sides in such
an argument are appealing to a transcendent moral norm and need
the facts to bolster their claims to the norm. Imagine, for example,
that the following norms are widely accepted in our society:
(a) The killing of innocent human life is wrong except in the
most extreme circumstances.
(b) People have the right to choose beneficial medical proce-
dures, but not to choose harmful ones.
If these are widely shared norms, then the arguments over fetal hu-
manity and the harm, if any, done to the woman by abortion are
obviously in competition to satisfy the norms. But this is not
wholly adequate as an explanation, for the pro-lifers and pro-
choicers are not really battling over these norms except in public.
They would not insist on slanting the evidence this way or that (or
insist on doubting evidence that cuts the other way) unless driven
by moral visions entirely independent of the transcendent norms
that I have mentioned. And those moral visions must be that ilbor-
tion is right--or wrong-without regard to fetal humanity or harm
to the pregnant woman.
I said that there were two reasons that the combatants in the
abortion battle so often prefer to talk the language of science rather
than the language of morality. The second reason is that they have
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no choice, because if they debated morality, they would be talking
past each other. In a morally pluralistic nation like ours, it is often
difficult to carry on public moral dialogue, because people begin
from so many different premises. Among the purposes of liberal
theory is to find a way to mediate the dialogue that liberalism needs
if it is to remain a coherent theory of politics, rather than just a
theory about desirable ends. One way in which some liberal theo-
rists try to mediate the dialogic difficulty is to impose on public
dialogue a requirement of "rationality." For the moment, neither
the definition of nor the justification for rationality matters. I will
discuss both a bit toward the end of tomorrow evening's lecture.
The point I would like to make now is that in constitutional ana-
lysis, and therefore in most of our moral debate, the idea of rational-
ity as a mediating force has been transformed into the idea of
science as a mediating force. Scientism is the whole game; the con-
stitutional battle goes to the side that produces the more convincing
expert evidence. So it is unsurprising that pro-choice and pro-life
forces argue so vehemently over empirical matters that have noth-
ing to do with their actual moral dispute. For their actual moral
dispute is one that liberal dialogue cannot resolve. It is also one
that constitutional courts almost certainly will not resolve, except
by empirical means. Just think of Roe v. Wade's "resolution": tri-
mesters, viability, harm to the pregnant woman. All of it is the
language of empirical morality, and all of it, like the analysis in
Brown, is open to empirical challenge.
Now, you might be wondering why any of this matters. After all,
even if constitutional judges are showing a bias toward answering
empirical questions rather than moral ones, we don't really want
them answering moral questions, do we? And besides, at least if we
get the empirical evidence straight, we will have the facts before us
and can argue about their significance, right?
Unfortunately, matters are never quite as simple as we would
like. The first point-that constitutional judges should not in any
case be making moral judgments-is readily disposed of. It is cer-
tainly true that the liberal ideal of the objective judge holds that the
province of morality is the province of the legislature, and the
judge's role is to test the legislature's moral judgment against the
requisites of the Constitution. We all know, however, that our
judges all too rarely fulfill that ideal. When a judge fails to separate
her personal moral sentiment from her constitutional analysis, the
least we can ask is that she be kind enough to let us know it.
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Furthermore, when judges treat constitutional questions as em-
pirical inquiries, they often are still making moral judgments; they
are simply hiding them. To go back to the example of Brown v.
Board of Education, it is difficult to imagine that the Justices who
treated the inquiry as empirical were doing so out of an unbiased
search for constitutional meaning. Surely it is more likely that the
Court was bolstering its moral judgment that segregation is wrong
with the empirical claim that segregation is harmful.
This leads to the second set of objections: Isn't it a good thing to
decide what the facts are? Aren't constitutional judges who prefer
counting to reasoning doing us all a favor?
My answers are yes and no. Yes, it is good to know the facts.
No, the judges are not doing us a favor. The principal difficulty
with treating constitutional questions as empirical is not, as you
might think, that somebody might come along next year with a new
set of studies proving that segregation does more good than harm.
No, the principal difficulty is that someone might come along next
year who denies that psychological studies are the way to determine
whether harm has occurred. Someone might come along next year
and say-as the group sometimes known as the race critical schol-
ars might argue-that segregation is harmful if the segregated say
that it is harmful.
Now, you might say, what's so radical about that? Why not
judge the harmfulness of segregation by asking people?
Perhaps nothing is wrong with doing it that way; although, bear
in mind that this critique would bar any important role for social
science. No psychological studies, no sociological observations, just
the massed voices of the oppressed. That would be the way in
which the courts would decide the harmfulness.
Of course, someone might come along and say, "No, no, the right
way to judge the harmfulness of segregation is to ask the segre-
gators, who after all are the majority." And at this point we might
all put on our Herbert Wechsler hats and ask what neutral principle
exists to tell the court that the relevant judgment on whether segre-
gation is harmful is the judgment of the segregated or the segrega-
tor.44 I would suggest that unless the court has already made up its
mind that segregation is harmful, no neutral principle exists.
(Which is not the same as saying that a neutral principle is what is
needed.) And even though Wechsler was critical of the reasoning of
44 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles o/Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
I (1959).
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Brown itself, I think it was the fear that a neutral principle did not
exist that led the Brown Court to dump the whole matter in the lap
of "neutral" social scientists, and, in that way, as I have already
suggested, turn the constitutional assault on segregation into a deli-
cate chastisement for sloppy analysis.
But I use the term "neutral" advisedly. If you thought that you
detected quotation marks in my voice, you were right. I am wary of
the word not because I suspect social scientists of harboring or per-
haps nurturing prejudices that bias their statistics. I am wary of the
word because the neutrality of the social sciences, like the neutrality
of the natural sciences, exists only within a particular way of look-
ing at the world.
No doubt you're wondering what I mean. Let me try to make the
point by example-in fact, by returning to what I said earlier about
the morality of the fanatic. Let's pick a hypothetical fanatic and
call him the Ayatollah Khomeini. And let us further say, still
speaking hypothetically, that he has sentenced to death a mythical
author, whom we might call Salman Rushdie, and that the Ayatol-
lah's disagreement with Rushdie revolves around a hypothetical
book. Let's call it The Satanic Verses.
Now, what is it that makes the Ayatollah a fanatic? It can't be
that he has sentenced Rushdie to death: four out of five Americans
think death sentences are just fine. And it can't be that he has sen-
tenced Rushdie to death for what Rushdie thinks or writes, because
although that is not a very liberal way to behave, it is certainly a
common enough occurrence on this unhappy globe. No, if the
Ayatollah is a fanatic, the reason must have something to do not
with the death sentence as such, but with the justification for the
death sentence. The death sentence, if it was a death sentence, was
meted out on explicitly religious grounds. And that is what makes
the Ayatollah, in iiberal terms, a fanatic.
You see, we are back where we started: the fanatical moralist is
the moralist who is not amenable to reason and, in particular, who
is not amenable to facts as the liberal sees them. Many people who
are religiously devout derive at least large parts of their world view
from an epistemology that is very different from the materialist epis-
temology on which empirical morality depends. So the problem
with thinking of scientism as a neutral mediating force is that the
effort to turn moral questions into empirical ones actually devalues
some modes of thinking-particularly the religious mode-that
many millions of Americans may consider superior.
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The current liberal message to people whose moral judgments
have religious roots is that they are not welcome in public dialogue
until they start speaking the same language as everyone else. I am
not even sure that this is good constitutional law. I am quite sure
that it is morally problematic, and that the inability of liberalism to
accommodate (at least so far) the resurgence in religious faith is
perhaps the greatest contemporary threat to liberalism as a political
theory. In tomorrow night's lecture, I will sketch a few of the rea-
sons that I fear for the future of liberalism.
In this evening's remarks, I hope that I have at least convinced
you of two things: first, that constitutional courts prefer to tum
moral questions into empirical ones when they can, and, second,
that this tendency reflects the way that science has replaced God as
an authority figure in moral dialogue. Whether or not you agree
that the trend is problematic, I hope that you at least agree that the
trend exists.
Before ending for the evening, I would like to build a bridge to
tomorrow night's subject by muddying the waters a bit further. No
doubt many of you are aware of the cases involving Jehovah's Wit-
nesses and blood transfusions. As you may know, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses believe that a blood transfusion from one human being to
another violates the Old Testament's ban on eating human flesh.
(Well, actually it's also in Acts, but it comes from Leviticus, so we
can call it Old Testament.) To eat human flesh, according to the
Witnesses, is to lose, perhaps forever, the possibility of salvation.
As the Jehovah's Witness understands God's law, moreover, the
issue is not whether the blood transfusion is given against the recipi-
ent's will, but whether the recipient is, at the time of the transfu-
sion, actively protesting. This is the reason that Jehovah's
Witnesses will sometimes try to impede the physical access of medi-
cal personnel to an unconscious Witness: lack of consciousness is
no defense. This is also the reason that Witnesses try to make the
decision on behalf of their children: a child cannot be trusted to
protest adequately.
The machinery of law has not been particularly impressed with
the Jehovah's Witnesses' arguments. There are many cases in
which courts have allowed transfusions to save the lives of uncon-
scious Witnesses, even though the patient might have indicated a
desire while conscious not to be transfused. In every decided case
that I have found in which Jehovah's Witness parents have tried to
prevent their children from being transfused, the court has ruled for
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the hospital, and the transfusion has proceeded in the face of paren-
tal objection.
Now, if you will recall, the stated basis for the objection is that
eternal salvation will be lost if the transfusion is received. The
query which I would like to leave open until tomorrow night is this:
Is the statement "If I am transfused, God will refuse me eternal
salvation" a statement of fact or a statement of a value?
* * * *
End of First Lecture
